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Abstract
In the classical secretary problem, one attempts to find the maxi-
mum of an unknown and unlearnable distribution through sequential
search. In many real-world searches, however, distributions are not
entirely unknown and can be learned through experience. To inves-
tigate learning in such a repeated secretary problem we conduct a
large-scale behavioral experiment in which people search repeatedly
from fixed distributions. In contrast to prior investigations that find
no evidence for learning in the classical scenario, in the repeated set-
ting we observe substantial learning resulting in near-optimal stopping
behavior. We conduct a Bayesian comparison of multiple behavioral
models which shows that participants’ behavior is best described by a
class of threshold-based models that contains the theoretically optimal
strategy. Fitting such a threshold-based model to data reveals players’
estimated thresholds to be surprisingly close to the optimal thresholds
after only a small number of games.
Keywords: Bayesian model comparison; experiments; human behavior;
learning; secretary problem
1 Introduction
In the secretary problem, an agent evaluates candidates one at a time in
search of the best one, making an accept or reject decision after each evalu-
ation. Only one candidate can be accepted, and once rejected, a candidate
can never be recalled. It is called the secretary problem because it resembles
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a hiring process in which candidates are interviewed serially and, if rejected
by one employer, are quickly hired by another.
Since its appearance in the mid-twentieth century, the secretary problem
has enjoyed exceptional popularity (Freeman, 1983). It is the prototypical
optimal stopping problem, attracting so much interest from so many fields
that one review article concluded that it “constitutes its own ‘field’ of study”
(Ferguson, 1989). In this century, analyses, extensions, and tests of the
secretary problem have appeared in decision science, computer science, eco-
nomics, statistics, psychology, and operations research (Alpern and Baston,
2017; Palley and Kremer, 2014; Bearden et al., 2006).
The intense academic interest in the secretary problem may have to
do with its similarity to real-life search problems such as choosing a mate
(Todd, 1997), choosing an apartment (Zwick et al., 2003) or hiring, for
example, a secretary. It may have to do with the way the problem exemplifies
the concerns of core branches of economics and operations research that
deal with search costs. Lastly, the secretary problem may have endured
because of curiosity about its fascinating solution. In the classic version of
the problem, the optimal strategy is to ascertain the maximum of the first
1/e boxes and then stop after the next box that exceeds it. Interestingly,
this 1/e stopping rule wins about 1/e of the time in the limit (Gilbert and
Mosteller, 1966). The curious solution to the secretary problem only holds
when the values in the boxes are drawn from an unknown distribution. To
make this point clear, in some empirical studies of the problem, participants
only get to learn the rankings of the boxes instead of the values (e.g., Seale
and Rapoport, 1997). But is it realistic to assume that people cannot learn
about the distributions in which they are searching?
In many real-world searches, people can learn about the distribution
of the quality of candidates as they search. The first time a manager hires
someone, she may have only a vague guess as to the quality of the candidates
that will come through the door. By the fiftieth hire, however, she’ll have
hundreds of interviews behind her and know the distribution rather well.
This should cause her accuracy in a real-life secretary problem to increase
with experience.
While people seemingly should be able improve at the secretary problem
with experience, surprisingly, prior academic research does not find evidence
that they do. For example, Campbell and Lee (2006) attempted to get
participants to learn by offering enriched feedback and even financial rewards
in a repeated secretary problem, but concluded “there is no evidence people
learn to perform better in any condition”. Similarly, Lee (2006) found no
evidence of learning, nor did Seale and Rapoport (1997).
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In contrast, by way of a randomized experiment with thousands of play-
ers, we find that performance improves dramatically over a few trials and
soon approaches optimal levels. We will show that players steadily increase
their probability of winning the game with more experience, eventually com-
ing close to the optimal win rate. Then we show that the improved win rates
are due to players learning to make better decisions on a box-by-box basis
and not just due to aggregating over boxes. Furthermore we will show that
the learning we observe occurs in a noisy environment where the feedback
they get, i.e. win or lose, may be unhelpful. After showing various types of
learning in our data we turn our attention to modeling the players behavior.
Using a Bayesian comparison framework we show that players’ behavior is
best described by a family of threshold-based models which include the op-
timal strategy. Moreover, the estimated thresholds are surprisingly close to
the optimal thresholds after only a small number of games.
2 Related Work
While the total number of articles on the secretary problem is large Free-
man (1983), our concern with empirical, as opposed to purely theoretical,
investigations reduces these to a much smaller set. We discuss here the most
similar to our investigation. Ferguson (1989) usefully defines a “standard”
version of the secretary problem as follows:
1. There is one secretarial position available.
2. The number n of applicants is known.
3. The applicants are interviewed sequentially in random order,
each order being equally likely.
4. It is assumed that you can rank all the applicants from best
to worst without ties. The decision to accept or reject an appli-
cant must be based only on the relative ranks of those applicants
interviewed so far.
5. An applicant once rejected cannot later be recalled.
6. You are very particular and will be satisfied with nothing but
the very best.
The one point on which we deviated from the standard problem is the
fourth. To follow this fourth assumption strictly, instead of presenting peo-
ple with raw quality values, some authors (e.g., Seale and Rapoport, 1997)
present only the ranks of the candidates, updating the ranks each time a
3
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new candidate is inspected. This prevents people from learning about the
distribution. However, because the purpose of this work is to test for im-
provement when distributions are learnable, we presented participants with
actual values instead of ranks.
Others properties of the classical secretary problem could have been
changed. For example, there exist alternate versions in which there is a
payout for choosing candidates other than the best. These “cardinal” and
“rank-dependent” payoff variants (Bearden, 2006) violate the sixth property
above. We performed a literature search and found fewer than 100 papers on
these variants, while finding over 2,000 papers on the standard variant. Our
design preserves the sixth property for two reasons. First, by preserving
it, our results will be directly comparable to the the greatest number of
existing theoretical and empirical analyses. Second, changing more than
one variable at a time is undesirable because it makes it difficult to identify
which variable change is responsible for changes in outcomes.
While prior investigations, listed next, have looked at people’s perfor-
mance on the secretary problem, none have exactly isolated the condition
of making the distributions learnable. Across several articles, Lee and col-
leagues (Lee, 2006; Campbell and Lee, 2006; Lee et al., 2004) conducted
experiments in which participants were shown values one at a time and
were told to try to stop at the maximum. Across these papers, the number
of candidates (or boxes or secretaries) ranged from 5 to 50 and participants
played from 40 to 120 times each. In all these studies, participants knew
that the values were drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100.
For instance, Lee (2006) states, “It was emphasized that ... the values were
uniformly and randomly distributed between 0.00 and 100.00”. With such
an instruction, players can immediately and exactly infer the percentiles of
the values presented to them, which helps them calculate the probability
that unexplored values may exceed what they have seen. As participants
were told about the distribution, these experiments do not involve learning
distribution from experience, which is our concern. Information about the
distribution was also conveyed to participants in a study by Rapoport and
Tversky (1970), in which seven individual participants viewed an impres-
sive 15,600 draws from probability distributions over several weeks before
playing secretary problem games with values drawn from the same distri-
butions. These investigations are similar to ours in that they both involve
repeated play and that they present players with actual values instead of
ranks. That is, they depart from the fourth feature of the standard secretary
problem listed above. These studies, however, differ from ours in that they
give participants information about the distribution from which the values
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are drawn before they begin to play. In contrast, in our version of the game,
participants are told no information about the distribution, see no samples
from it before playing, and do not know what the minimum or maximum
values could be. This key difference between the settings may have had a
great impact. For instance, in the studies by Lee and colleagues, the authors
did not find evidence of learning or players becoming better with experience.
In contrast, we find profound learning and improvement with repeated play.
Corbin et al. (1975) ran an experiment in which people played repeated
secretary problems, with a key difference that these authors manipulated
the values presented to subjects with each trial. For instance, the authors
varied the support of the distribution from which values were drawn, and
manipulated the ratio and ranking of early values relative to later ones. The
manipulations were done in an attempt to prevent participants from learning
about the distribution and thus make each trial like the “standard” secretary
problem with an unknown distribution. Similarly, Palley and Kremer (2014)
provide participants with ranks for all but the selected option to hinder
learning about the distribution. In contrast, because our objective is to
investigate learning, we draw random numbers without any manipulation.
Finally, in a study by Kahan et al. (1967), groups of 22 participants were
shown up to 200 numbers chosen from either a left skewed, right skewed or
uniform distribution. In this study, as well as ours, participants were pre-
sented with actual values instead of ranks. Also like our study, distributions
of varying skew were used as stimuli. However, in Kahan et al. (1967),
participants played the game just one time and thus were not able to learn
about the distribution to improve at the game.
In summation, for various reasons, prior empirical investigations of the
secretary problem have not been designed to study learning about the dis-
tribution of values. These studies either informed participants about the
parameters of the distribution before the experiment, allowed participants
to sample from the distribution before the experiment, replaced values from
the distribution with ranks, manipulated values to prevent learning, or ran
single-shot games in which the effects of learning could not be applied to
future games. Our investigation concerns a repeated secretary problem in
which players can observe values drawn from distributions that are held
constant for each player from game to game.
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3 Experimental setup
To collect behavioral data on the repeated secretary problem with learnable
distributions of values, we created an online experiment. The experiment
was promoted as a contest on several web logs and attracted 6,537 players
who played the game at least one time. A total of 48,336 games were played
on the site. As users arrived at the game’s landing page, they were cookied
and their browser URL was automatically modified to include an identifier.
These two steps were taken to assign all plays on the same browser to the
same user id and condition, and to track person-to-person sharing of the
game URL. Any user determined to arrive at the site via a shared URL
(i.e., a non-cookied user entering via a modified URL) was excluded from
analysis and is not counted in the 6,537 we analyze. We note that including
these users makes little difference to our results and that we only exclude
them to obtain a set of players that were randomly assigned to conditions by
the website. Users saw the following instructions. Blanks stand in the place
of the number of boxes, which was randomly assigned and will be described
later.
You have been captured by an evil dictator. He forces you to play
a game. There are boxes. Each box has a different amount
of money in it. You can open any number of boxes in any order.
After opening each box, you can decide to open another box or
you can stop by clicking the stop sign. If you hit stop right after
opening the box with the most money in it (of the boxes),
then you win. However, if you hit stop at any other time, you
lose and the evil dictator will kill you. Try playing a few times
and see if you improve with practice.
The secretary problem was lightly disguised as the “evil dictator game”
to someone lessen the chances that a respondent would search for the prob-
lem online and discover the classical solution. Immediately beneath the
instructions was an icon of a traffic stop sign and the message “When you
are done opening boxes, click here to find out if you win”. Beneath this on
the page were hyperlinks stating “Click here to open the first box”,“Click
here to open the second box”, and so on. As each link was clicked, an AJAX
call retrieved a box value from the server, recorded it in a database and pre-
sented it to the user. If the value in the box was the highest seen thus far,
it was marked as such on the screen. See Figure 10 in the Appendix for a
screenshot. Every click and box value was recorded, providing a record of
6
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the three distribu-
tions from which box values were randomly drawn in the experiment. As
probability density functions, the “low” distribution is strongly positively
skewed, the “medium” distribution is a uniform distribution, and the “high”
distribution is strongly negatively skewed.
every box value seen by every player, as well as every stopping point. If a
participant tried to stop at a box that was dominated by (i.e., less than)
an already opened box, a pop-up explained that doing so would necessarily
result in the player losing. After clicking on the stop icon or reaching the
last box in the sequence, participants were redirected to a page that told
them whether they won or lost, and showed them the contents of all the
boxes, where they stopped, where the maximum value was, and by how
many dollars (if any) they were short of the maximum value. To increase
the amount of data submitted per person, players were told “Please play at
least six times so we can calculate your stats”.
3.1 Experimental Conditions
To allow for robust conclusions that are not tied to the particularities of
one variant of the game, we randomly varied two parameters of the game:
the distributions and the number of boxes. Each player was tied to these
randomly assigned conditions so that their immediate repeat plays, if any,
would be in the same conditions.
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3.1.1 Random assignment to distributions
The box values were randomly drawn from one of three probability distri-
butions, as pictured in Figure 1. The maximum box value was 100 million,
though this was not known by the participants. The “low” condition was
strongly negatively skewed. Random draws from it tend to be less than
10 million, and the maximum value tends to be notably different than the
next highest value. For instance, among 15 boxes drawn from this distribu-
tion, the highest box value is, on average, about 14.5 million dollars higher
than the second highest value. In the “medium” condition numbers were
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 100 million.
The maximum box values in 15 box games are on average 6.2 million dollars
higher than the next highest values. Finally, in the “high” condition, boxes
values were strongly negatively skewed, and bunched up near 100 million.
In this condition, most of the box values tend to look quite similar (typically
eight-digit numbers greater than 98 million). Among 15 boxes, the average
difference between the maximum value and the next highest is rather small
at only about 80,000 dollars. Note that the distributions are merely window
dressing and are irrelevant for playing the game. Players only need to at-
tend to percentiles of the distribution to make optimal stopping decisions.
However, the varying distributions leads to more generalizable results than
an analysis of a single, arbitrary setting.
3.1.2 Random assignment to number of boxes
The second level of random assignment concerned the number of boxes,
which was either 7 or 15. While one would think this approximate doubling
in the number of boxes would make the game quite a bit harder, it only
affects theoretically optimal win rates by about 2 percentage points, as will
be shown. Like with the distributions, varying the number of boxes leads to
more generalizable results.
With either 7 or 15 boxes and three possible distributions, the exper-
iment had a 2 × 3 design. In the 7 box condition, 1145, 1082, and 1103
participants were randomly assigned to the low, medium, and high distribu-
tions, respectively, and in the 15 box condition, the counts were 1065, 1127,
and 1015, respectively. The number of subjects assigned to the different
conditions was not signficiantly different whether comparing the two box
conditions (7 or 15), the three distributions of box values (low, medium, or
high), or all six cells of the experiment by chi-squared tests (all ps > 0.05).
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3.2 Optimal play
Before we begin to analyze the behavioral data gathered from these exper-
iments we first discuss how one would play this game optimally. Assume
values Xt are drawn in an independently and identically distributed fashion
from a cumulative distribution function F . One period consists of a player
opening a box with a realization xt of Xt in box t. Periods are numbered
in reverse order starting at T , so t = T, . . . , 1. Periods are thus numbered
in the reverse order of the boxes in the game, that is, opening the first box
implies being in the seventh period (of a seven box game). An action is to
select or reject. For example at time t, select box t, otherwise reject box t.
Let
ht = max {xt, ..., xT } .
The history summary ht+1 is visible to the player at time t. The payoff of
the player who selects box t is{
1 ht = h1
0 ht < h1
.
Thus, the player only wins when they select the highest value. The prob-
lem is nontrivial because they are forced to choose without knowing future
realizations of the Xi.
Optimal players will adopt a threshold rule, which says, possibly as a
function of the history, accept the current value if it is greater than a critical
dollar value ct. It is a dominant strategy to reject any realization worse
than the best historically observed, except for the last box which must be
accepted if opened. In addition, in our game, a pop-up warning prevented
players from choosing dominated boxes.
With a known distribution independently distributed across periods, the
critical dollar value will be the maximum of the historically best value and
a critical dollar value that does not depend on the history. The reason
that the critical dollar value does not depend on the history is that there is
nothing to learn about the future (known distribution) so it is either better
to accept the current value than wait for a better future value or not; the
point of indifference is exactly our critical dollar value. Thus, the threshold
comes in the form max{ct, ht}.
In addition, ct is non-decreasing in t. Suppose, for the sake of contradic-
tion, that ct > ct+1. Taking any candidate in the interval (ct+1, ct) entails
accepting a candidate and then immediately regretting it, because as soon
as the candidate is accepted, the candidate is no longer acceptable, being
worse than ct.
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Table 1: Critical values and probability of winning given a known distribu-
tion of values for up to 15 boxes.
Boxes
left,
t
Critical
values
zt
Pr(Win)
pt(0)
1 0 1
2 0.5 0.750
3 0.6899 0.684
4 0.7758 0.655
5 0.8246 0.639
6 0.8559 0.629
7 0.8778 0.622
8 0.8939 0.616
9 0.9063 0.612
10 0.9160 0.609
11 0.9240 0.606
12 0.9305 0.604
13 0.9361 0.602
14 0.9408 0.600
15 0.9448 0.599
Let i = T − t, and zi = F (ct). We refer to the zt as the critical values,
which are are the probabilities of observing a value less than the critical
dollar values ct. Let pt(h) be the probability of a win given a history h.
Table 1 provides the critical values zt and the probability of winning given a
zero history pt(0) for fifteen periods. Derivations of these figures are found
in section A in the Appendix.
The relevant entries for our study are the games of 7 and 15 periods.
These calculations, which coincide with those found in Gilbert and Mosteller
(1966), who did not provide Equation (9) (see the Appendix), show that
experienced players, who know the distribution, can hope to win at best
62.2% of the games for 7 period games and just under 60% of the time
for 15 period games. Note that these numbers compare favorably with the
usual secretary result, which are lesser for all game lengths, converging to
the famous 1/e as the length diverges. Thus there is substantial value in
knowing the distribution.
As is reasonably well known, the value of the classical secretary solution
can be found by choosing a value k to sample, and then setting the best
10
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Table 2: The probability of winning a game in the classical secretary problem
(unknown distribution of values) for up to fifteen boxes
Game Length Classical Secretary
(Periods) Problem Pr(Win)
1 1
2 0.50
3 0.50
4 0.458
5 0.433
6 0.428
7 0.414
8 0.410
9 0.406
10 0.399
11 0.398
12 0.396
13 0.392
14 0.392
15 0.389
value observed in the first k periods as a critical value. The distribution of
the maximum of the first k is F (x)k. The probability that a better value
is observed in round m is (1 − F (x))F (x)m−k−1. Suppose this value is y;
then this value wins with probability F (y)T−m. Thus the probability of
winning for a fixed value of k and T periods is kT
∑T
m=k+1
1
m−1 . See the
derivation in Section B in the Appendix. The optimal value of k maximizes
k
T
∑T
m=k+1
1
m−1 and is readily computed to yield Table 2. Comparing the
probability of winning shown in Tables 1 and 2 shows that making the
distribution learnable allows for a much higher rate of winning.
How well can players do learning the distribution? To model this, we
consider an idealized agent that plays the secretary problem repeatedly and
learns from experience. The agent begins with the critical values and learns
the percentiles of the distribution from experience; it will be referred to as
the “LP” (learn percentiles) agent. The agent has a perfect memory, makes
no mistakes, has derived the critical values in Table 1 correctly, and can
re-estimate the percentiles of a distribution with each new value it observes.
It is difficult to imagine a human player being able to learn at a faster rate
than the LP agent. We thus include it as an unusually strong benchmark.
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3.3 Learning Percentiles: The LP agent
The LP agent starts off knowing the critical values for a 7 or 15 box game
in percentile terms. To be precise, these critical values are the first 7 or 15
rows under the heading zt in Table 1. (Despite the term “percentile”, we use
decimal notation instead of percentages for convenience.) The reason that
the LP agent is not given the critical values as raw box values is that these
would be unknowable because the distribution is unknown before the first
play. However, it is possible to compute these critical values as percentiles
from first principles, as we have done earlier in this section and in the Ap-
pendix. Armed with these critical values, the LP agent converts the box
values it observes into percentiles in order to compare them to the critical
values. The first box value the LP agent sees gets assigned an estimated
percentile of .50. If the second observed box value is greater than the first,
it estimates the second value’s percentile to be .75 and re-estimates the first
value’s percentile to be .25. If the second value is smaller than the first, it
assigns the estimate of .25 to the second value and .75 to the first value.
It continues in this way, re-estimating percentiles for every subsequent box
value encountered according to the percentile rank formula:
N< + 0.5N=
N
(1)
where N< is the number of values seen so far that are less than the given
value, N= is the number of times the given value has occurred so far, and
N is the number of boxes opened so far.
After recomputing all of the percentiles, the agent compares the per-
centile of the box just opened to the relevant critical value and decides
to stop if the percentile exceeds the critical value, or decides to continue
searching if it falls beneath it, making sure never to stop on a dominated
box unless it is in the last position and therefore has no choice. Recall that a
dominated box is one that is less than the historical maximum in the current
game. The encountered values are retained from game to game, meaning
that the agent’s estimates of the percentiles of the distribution will approach
perfection and win rates will approach the optima in Table 1.
How well does the LP agent perform? Figure 2 shows its performance.
Comparing its win rate on the first play to the 7 and 15 box entries in Table 2,
we see that the LP agent matches the performance of the optimal player of
the classic secretary problem in its first game. Performance increases steeply
over the first three games and achieves the theoretical maxima (black lines)
in seven or fewer games. In any given game a player can either stop when
12
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Figure 2: Rates of winning (red lines), stopping too soon (blue lines) and
stopping too late (green lines) for the LP agent. The theoretically maximal
win rates for 7 and 15 boxes are given by the solid black lines.
it sees the maximum value, in which case it wins, or the player could stop
before or after the maximum value, in which case it loses. In addition to
the win rates, Figure 2 also shows how often agents commit these two types
of errors. Combined error is necessarily the complement of the win rate so
the steep gain in one implies a steep drop the other. Both agents are more
likely to stop before the maximum as opposed to after it, which we will see
is also the case with human players.
The LP agent serves as strong benchmark against which human perfor-
mance can be compared. It is useful to study its performance in simulation
because the existing literature provides optimal win rates for many varia-
tions of the secretary problem, but is silent on how well an idealized agent
would do when learning from scratch. In addition to win rates, these agents
show the patterns of error that even idealized players would make on the
13
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path to optimality. In the next section, we will see how these idealized win
and error rates compare to those of the human players in the experiment.
4 Behavioral Results: Learning Effects
As 48,336 games were played by 6,537 users, the average user played 7.39
games. Roughly half (49.6%) of users played 5 games or more, a quarter
(23.2%) played 9 games or more, and a tenth (9.3%) played 16 games or
more.
Prior research (e.g., Lee, 2006) has found no evidence of learning in
repeated secretary problems with known distributions. What happens with
unknown but learnable distribution? As shown in Figure 3, players rapidly
improve in their first games and come within five to ten percentage points of
theoretically maximal levels of performance. The leftmost point on each red
curve indicates the how often first games are won. The next point to the right
represents second games, and so on. The solid black lines at .622 and .599
show the maximal win rate attainable by an agent with perfect knowledge
of the distribution. Note that these lines are not a fair comparison for early
plays of the game in which knowledge of the distribution is imperfect or
completely absent; in pursuit of a fair benchmark, we computed the win
rates of the idealized LP agent shown in the dashed gray lines.
Performance in the first games, in which players have very little knowl-
edge of the distribution is quite a bit lower than would be expected by
optimal play in the classic secretary problem with 7 (optimal win rate .41)
or 15 boxes (optimal win rate .39). Thus, some of the learning has to do
with starting from a low base. However, the classic version’s optima are
reached by about the second game and improvement continues another 10
to 15 percentage points beyond the classic optima.
One could argue that the apparent learning we observe is not learning
at all but a selection effect. By this logic, a common cause (e.g., higher
intelligence) is responsible both for players persisting longer at the game and
winning more often. To check this, we created Figure 11, in the Appendix,
which is a similar plot except it restricts to players who played at least 7
games. Because we see very similar results with and without this restriction,
we conclude that Figure 3 reflects learning and not selection effects.
Recall that our experiment had a 2×3 design with either 7 or 15 boxes
and one of three possible underlying distributions of the box values. Figure
3 shows the average probability of our subjects winning in the 7 and 15 box
treatments aggregated over the three different distributions of box values.
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Figure 3: Solid red, blue and green lines indicate the rates of winning the
game and committing errors for human players with varying levels of ex-
perience. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error; when they are not visible
they are smaller than the points. The area of each point is proportional to
the number of players in the average. The graph is cut at 20 games as less
than 1% of games played were beyond a user’s 20th. The dashed gray line
is the rate of winning the game for the LP agent. The solid black horizontal
lines indicate the maximal win rate for an agent with perfect knowledge of
the distribution.
Figure 4 shows the probability of people winning in each of the six treatments
of our experiment. First, observe that the probability of winning, indicated
by the red lines, increases towards the maximal win rate in each of the six
treatments. In all six treatments, most of the learning happens in the early
games with diminishing returns to playing more games. This qualitative
similarity demonstrates the robustness of the finding that there is rapid and
substantial learning in just a few repeated plays of the secretary problem.
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Figure 4: Solid red, blue, and green lines indicate the rates of winning
the game and committing errors for human players with varying levels of
experience. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error; when they are not visible
they are smaller than the points. The solid black horizontal lines indicate the
maximal win rate for an agent with perfect knowledge of the distribution.
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Figure 5: Search depth for players in their first games measured by the
number of boxes opened. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error
By comparing the probability of winning across all six treatments one can
see that the low and medium distributions were about equally as difficult and
that the high distribution was the hardest as it had the lowest probability
of winning. To understand this, we next examine the types of errors the
participants made. The probability of stopping after the maximum box
value, indicated by the green lines, is fairly similar across all six treatments.
There is, however, variation in the probability of stopping before the max,
indicated by the blue lines, across the six treatments. Participants were
more likely to stop before the maximum box in the high condition than
the others which explains why the subjects found this treatment to be the
hardest. Since the overall qualitative trends are fairly similar across the
three different distributions of box values we will aggregate over them in the
analyses that follow.
Having established that players do learn from experience, we turn our
attention to what is being learned. One overarching trend is that soon after
their first game, people learn to search less. As seen in Figure 5, in the first
five games, the depth of search decreases by about a third of one box. Players
can lose by stopping too early or too late. These search depth results suggest
that stopping too late is the primary concern that participants address early
in their sequence of games. This is also reflected in the rate of decrease in
the “stopping after max” errors in Figure 3 and 4. In both panels, rates of
stopping after the maximum decrease most rapidly.
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Figure 6: Left panel: Empirical rates of stopping search for box values
above and below the critical values. Right panel: Version of 6(a) with data
from simulated agents instead of human players. Only non-dominated boxes
are included in this analysis.
4.1 Optimality of box-by-box decisions
Do players’ decisions become more optimal with experience? Recall that
when the distribution is known one can make an optimal decision about
when to stop search by comparing the percentile of an observed box value
to the relevant critical value in Table 1. If the observed value exceeds the
critical value, it is optimal to stop, otherwise it is optimal to continue search.
In Figure 6, the horizontal axis shows the difference between observed box
values (as percentiles) and the critical values given in Table 1. The vertical
axis shows the probability of stopping search when values above or below the
critical values are encountered. The data in the left panel are from human
players and reflect all box-by-box decisions.
An optimal player who knows the exact percentile of any box value, as
well as the critical values, would always keep searching (stop with proba-
bility 0) when encountering a value whose percentile is below the critical
value. Similarly, such an optimal player would always stop searching (stop
with probability 1) when encountering a value whose percentile exceeds the
critical value. Together these two behaviors would lead to a step function:
stopping with probability 0 to the left of the critical value and stopping with
probability 1 above it.
Figure 6(a) shows that on first games (in red), players tend to both
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under-search (stopping about 25% of the time when below the critical value)
and to over-search (stopping at a maximum of 75% of the time instead of
100% of the time when above the critical value). In a player’s second through
fourth games (in green) performance is much improved, and the probability
of stopping search is close to the ideal .5 at the critical value. The blue curve,
showing performance in later games, approaches ideal step function. To
address possible selection effects in this analysis, Figure 12 in the Appendix
is similar to Figure 6 except it restricts to the games of those who played
a substantial number of games. Because there are fewer observations, the
error bars are larger but the overall trends are the same suggesting again
that these results are due to learning as opposed to selection bias.
Attaining ideal step-function performance is not realistic when learning
about the distribution from experience. Comparison to the LP agent pro-
vides a baseline of how well one could ever hope to do. Figure 6(b) shows
that in early games, even the LP agent both stops and continues when it
should not. Failing to obey the optimal critical values is a necessary conse-
quence of learning about a distribution from experience. Compared to the
human players, however, the LP agent approaches optimality more rapidly.
Furthermore, on the first game, it is less likely to make large-magnitude
errors. While the human players never reach the ideal stopping rates of 0
and 1 on the first game, the LP agent does so when the observed values are
sufficiently far from the critical vales.
Figure 6(a) shows that stopping decisions stay surprisingly close to opti-
mal thresholds in aggregate. Recall that the optimal thresholds depend on
how many boxes are left to be opened (see Table 1). Because early boxes are
encountered more often than late ones, this analysis could be dominated by
decisions on the early boxes. To address this, in what follows we estimate
the threshold of each box individually.
4.2 Effects of unhelpful feedback
One may view winning or losing the game as a type of feedback for the player
to indicate if the strategy used needs adjusting. Taking this view, consider
a player’s first game. Say this player over-searched in the first game, that
is, they saw a value greater than the critical value but did not stop on it.
Assume further that this player won this game. This player did not play
the optimal strategy but won anyway, so their feedback was unhelpful. The
middle panel of Figure 7(a) shows the errors made during a second game
after over-searching and either winning or losing during their first game.
The red curve tends to be above the blue curve, meaning that players who
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Figure 7: Errors in the second (left) and fifth (right) games given whether
the first game was won (red curves) or lost (blue curves). Vertically arranged
panels indicate what type of error, if any, was made on the first game.
stopped too late but didn’t get punished (blue) are less likely to stop on
most box values in the next game, compared to players who stopped too
late and got punished (red).
Similarly, the bottom panel shows the blue curve to be above the red
curve, meaning that players who stopped too early but didn’t get punished
(blue) are more likely to stop on most box values in the next game, compared
to players who stopped too early and got punished (red).
This finding makes the results in Figures 3 and 6 even more striking as
it is a reminder that the participants are learning in an environment where
the feedback they receive is noisy. Figure 7(b) shows the errors in the fifth
game given the feedback from the first game. Even a quick glance shows that
the curves are essentially on top of each other. Thus, those who received
unhelpful feedback in the first game were able to recover—and perform just
as well as those who received helpful feedback—by the fifth game.
5 Modeling Player Decisions
In this section we explore the predictive performance of several models of
human behavior in the repeated secretary problem with learnable distri-
butions. We begin by describing our framework for evaluating predictive
models, then describe the models, and finally compare their performance.
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5.1 Evaluation and comparison
Our goal in this section is to compare several psychologically plausible mod-
els in terms of how well they capture human behavior in the repeated secre-
tary game to give us some insight as to how people are learning to play the
game. Since our goal is to compare how likely each model is given the data
the humans generated we use a Bayesian model comparison framework. The
models we compare, defined in Section 5.2, are probabilistic, allowing them
to express differing degrees of confidence in any given prediction. This also
allows them to capture heterogeneity between players. In contexts where
players’ actions are relatively homogeneous, their actions can be predicted
with a high degree of confidence, whereas in contexts where players’ actions
differ, the model can assign probability to each action.
After opening each box, a player makes a binary decision about whether
or not to stop. Our dataset consists of a set of stopping decisions ygt ∈ {0, 1}
that the player made in game g after seeing non-dominated box t. If the
player stopped at box t in game g, then ygt = 1; otherwise, y
g
t = 0. Our
dataset also contains the history xgT :t =
(
xgT , x
g
T−1, . . . , x
g
t
)
of box values
that the player had seen until each stopping decision. We represent the full
dataset by the notation D.
In our setting, a probabilistic model f maps from a history xgT :t to a
probability that the agent will stop. (This fully characterizes the agent’s
binary stopping decision.) Each model may take a vector θ of parameters
as input. We assume that every decision is independent of the others, given
the context. Hence, given a model and a vector of parameters, the likelihood
of our dataset is the product of the probabilities of its decisions; that is,
p (D |h, θ) =
∏
(xgT :t,y
g
t )∈D
[
f
(
xgT :t
∣∣ θ) ygt + (1− f (xgT :t ∣∣ θ)) (1− xgT :t)] .
In Bayesian model comparison, models are compared by how probable
they are given the data. That is, a model f1 is said to have better predictive
performance than model f2 if p
(
f1
∣∣D) > p (f2 ∣∣D), where
p (f | D) = p(f)p (D | f)
p(D) . (2)
With no a priori reason to prefer any specific model, we can assign them
equal prior model probabilities p(f). Comparing the model probabilities
defined in Equation (2) is thus equivalent to comparing the models’ model
evidence, defined as
p (D | f) =
∫
Θ
p (D | f, θ) p(θ)dθ. (3)
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The ratio of model evidences p
(D ∣∣ f1) /p (D ∣∣ f2) is called the Bayes factor
(e.g., see Kruschke, 2015). The larger the Bayes factor, the stronger the
evidence in favor of f1 versus f2.
This probabilistic approach has several advantages. First, the Bayes
factor between two models has a direct interpretation: it is the ratio of
probabilities of one model’s being the true generating model, conditional
on one of the models under consideration being the true model. Second, it
allows models to quantify the confidence of their predictions. This quantifi-
cation allows us to distinguish between models that are almost correct and
those that are far from correct in a way that is impossible for coarser-grained
comparisons such as predictive accuracy.
One additional advantage of the Bayes factor is that it provides some
compensation for overfitting. Models with a higher dimensional parameter
space are penalized, due to the fact that the integral in Equation (3) must
average over a larger space. The more flexible the model, the more of this
space will have low likelihood, and hence the better the fit must be in the
high-probability regions in order to attain the same evidence as a lower-
parameter model.
The amount by which high-dimensional models are penalized by the
Bayes factor depends strongly upon the choice of prior. This dependence
upon the relatively arbitrary choice of prior is undesirable. An alternative
approach is to evaluate models using cross-validation, in which the data are
split into a training set that is used to set the parameters of the model, and
a test set that is used to evaluate the model’s performance.
We use a hybrid of the cross-validation and Bayesian approaches. We
first randomly select a split s = (Dtrain,Dtest), with Dtrain ∪ Dtest = D and
Dtrain ∩ Dtrain = ∅. We then compute the cross-validated model evidence
of the test set Dtest with respect to the prior updated by the training set
p
(
θ
∣∣Dtrain), rather than computing the model evidence of the full dataset
D with respect to the prior p(θ). To reduce variance due to the randomness
introduced by the random split, we take expectation over the split, yielding
Esp
(Dtest ∣∣ f,Dtrain) = ∫ [∫
Θ
p
(Dtest ∣∣ f, θ) p (θ ∣∣Dtrain) dθ] p(s)ds, (4)
where p(s) is a uniform distribution over all splits. The ratio of cross-
validated model evidences
Esp
(Dtest ∣∣ f1,Dtrain)
Esp (Dtest | f2,Dtrain) (5)
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is called the cross-validated Bayes factor. As with the Bayes factor, larger
values of (5) indicate stronger evidence in favor of f1 versus f2.
The integral in Equation (4) is analytically intractable, so we followed
the standard practice of approximating it using Markov chain Monte Carlo
sampling. Specifically, we used the PyMC software package’s implementa-
tion (Salvatier et al., 2016) of the Slice sampler (Neal, 2003) to generate
25000 samples from each posterior distribution of interest, discarding the
first 5000 as a “burn in” period. We then used the “bronze estimator”
of Alqallaf and Gustafson (2001) to estimate Equation (4) based on this
posterior sample.
5.2 Models
We start by defining our candidate models, each of which assumes that
an agent decides at each non-dominated box whether to stop or continue,
based on the history of play until that point. For notational convenience,
we represent a history of play by a tuple containing the number of boxes
seen i, the number of non-dominated boxes seen i∗, and the percentile of
the the current box qi as estimated using Equation 1. Formally, each model
is a function f : N ×N × [0, 1] → [0, 1] that maps from a tuple (i, i∗, qi) to
a probability of stopping at the current box.
Definition 1 (Value Oblivious). In the Value Oblivious model, agents do
not attend to the specific box values. Instead, conditional upon reaching a
non-dominated box i, an agent stops with a fixed probability pi.
fvalue-oblivious
(
i, i∗, qi
∣∣∣ {pj}T−1j=1 ) = pi.
Definition 2 (Viable k). The Viable k model stops on the kth non-dominated
box.
fviablek (i, i∗, qi | k, ) =
{
 if i∗ < k,
1−  otherwise.
In this model and the next agents are assumed to err with probability  on
any given decision.
Definition 3 (Sample k). The Sample k model stops on the first non-
dominated box that it encounters after having seen at least k boxes, whether
those boxes were dominated or not.
f sample (i, i∗, qi | k, ) =
{
 if i < k,
1−  otherwise.
23
Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem Goldstein et al.
When k = dT/ee and  = 0, this corresponds to the optimal solution of the
classical secretary problem in which the distribution is unknown.
Definition 4 (Multiple Threshold). The Multiple Threshold model stops
at box i with increasing probability as the box value increases. We use
a logistic specification which yields a sigmoid function at each box i such
that at values equal to the threshold τi an agent stops with probability
0.5; an agent stops with greater (less) than 0.5 probability on values higher
(lower) than τi, with the probabilities becoming more certain as the value’s
distance from τi grows. We also learn a single parameter λ across all boxes
representing how quickly the probability changes as a box value becomes
further from τi. Intuitively, λ controls the slope of the sigmoid
1.
f thresholds
(
i, i∗, qi
∣∣∣λ, {τj}T−1j=1 ) = 11 + exp[λ(qi − τi)] .
When the thresholds are set to the critical values of Table 1 such that
τi = z(T−i+1), this model corresponds to the optimal solution of the secretary
problem with a known distribution.
Definition 5 (Single Threshold). The Single Threshold model is a simplified
threshold model in which agents compare all box values to a single threshold
τ rather than box-specific thresholds.
f single-threshold (i, i∗, qi |λ, τ) = 1
1 + exp[λ(qi − τ)] .
Definition 6 (Two Threshold). The Two Threshold model is another sim-
plified threshold model in which agents compare all “early” box values (the
first bT/2c boxes) to one threshold (τ0) and all “late” box values to another
(τ1).
f two-threshold (i, i∗, qi |λ, τ0, τ1) = 1
1 + exp[λ(qi − τν)] ,
where
τν =
{
τ0 if i <
T
2 ,
τ1 otherwise.
This is a low-parameter specification that nevertheless allows for differing
behavior as a game progresses (unlike Single Threshold).
1We considered models with one λ per box but they did not perform appreciably better
than the single λ models.
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Figure 8: Cross-validated Bayes factors for various models, compared to the
lowest-evidence model in each game.
Priors. Each of the models described above has free parameters that must
be estimated from the data. We used the following uninformative prior
distributions for each parameter:
pi ∼ Uniform[0, 1] τ, τi, τ0, τ1 ∼ Uniform[0, 1]
k ∼ Uniform{1, 2, . . . , T − 1} λ ∼ Exponential(µ = 1000).
 ∼ Uniform[0, 0.5]
The hyperparameter µ for precision parameters λ was chosen manually to
ensure good mixing of the sampler. Each parameter’s prior is independent;
e.g., in the single-threshold model a given pair (λ, τ) has prior probability
p(λ, τ) = p(λ)p(τ).
5.3 Model comparison results
Figure 8 gives the cross-validated Bayes factors for each of the models of Sec-
tion 5.2. The models were estimated separately for each number of games;
that is, each model was estimated once on all the first games played by
participants, again on all the second games, etc. This allows us to detect
learning by comparing the estimated values of the parameters across games.
The cross-validated Bayes factor is defined as a ratio between two cross-
validated model evidences. Since we are instead comparing multiple models,
we take the standard approach of expressing each factor with respect to the
lowest-evidence model for a given number of games. These normalized cross-
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validated Bayes factors are consistent, in the sense that if the normalized
cross-validated Bayes factor for model h1 is k times larger than the nor-
malized cross-validated Bayes factor for h2, then the cross-validated Bayes
factor between h1 and h2 is k. As a concrete example, the Two Threshold
model had the lowest cross-validated model evidence for participants’ first
games in the seven box condition; the cross-validated model evidence for
the Value Oblivious model was 1021 times greater than that of the Sample k
model, and 1040 times greater than that of the Viable k model.
In first game played, in both the seven box and fifteen box conditions,
and in second game in the fifteen box condition, the best performing model
was Value Oblivious. In all subsequent games and in both conditions, Vi-
able k was the worst performing model and the Multiple Threshold model
was the best performing model. The Two Threshold model was the next-
best performing model.2
Evidently, players behaved consistently with the optimal class of model
for the known distribution—multiple thresholds—as early as the second
game. This is consistent with the observations of Section 4.1, in which
players’ outcomes improved with repeated play. In addition, it is consistent
with the learning of optimal thresholds in Figure 6(a) but improves on that
analysis because here the most common stopping points—the early boxes—
do not dominate the average. Furthermore, players’ estimated thresholds
approached the theoretically optimal values remarkably quickly. Figure 9
shows the estimated thresholds for the seven box condition, along with their
95% posterior credible intervals. The estimated thresholds for the second
and subsequent games are strictly decreasing in the number of boxes seen,
like the optimal thresholds. Overall, the thresholds appear to more closely
approximate their optimal values over time. After only four games, each
threshold’s credible interval contains the optimal threshold value.3 Thus,
workers learned to play according to the optimal family of models and
learned the optimal threshold settings within that family of models.
The success of the Value Oblivious model in the first game (Figure 8)
suggests that neither of the threshold-based models fully capture players’
2We tested whether a different boundary between the two thresholds would perform
better by estimating a model in which the choice of boundary was a separate parameter.
This model actually performed worse that the Two Threshold model. This indicates that
the data do not argue strongly for a different boundary, and hence the only effect of adding
a boundary parameter was overfitting.
3In games 5–8, either one or two credible intervals no longer contain the corresponding
optimal value; by game 9 all thresholds’ credible intervals again contain their optimal
values.
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Figure 9: Estimated thresholds in the seven box games. The rightmost set
of points are the optimal thresholds. Error bars represent the 95% posterior
credible interval.
decision making in their initial game. This is further supported by the best-
estimates of thresholds for the first game: unlike subsequent games which
have thresholds that strictly decrease in number of boxes seen, in the first
game the estimated thresholds are strictly increasing in number of boxes
seen. This is consistent with players using a Value Oblivious model. If
players who stop on later boxes do so for reasons independent of the box’s
value, then they will tend to stop on higher values merely due to the selection
effect from only stopping on non-dominated boxes.
In sum, the switch from increasing to decreasing thresholds in Figure 9
is consistent with moving from a value-oblivious strategy, which generalizes
the optimal solution for the classical problem, to a threshold strategy, which
generalizes the optimal strategy for known distributions.
6 Conclusion: Behavioral Insights
The main research question we addressed in this work is whether people im-
prove at the secretary problem through repeated play. In contrast to prior
research (Campbell and Lee, 2006; Lee, 2006; Seale and Rapoport, 1997),
across thousands of players and tens of thousands of games, we document
fast and steep learning effects. Rates of winning increase by about 25 per-
centage points over the course of the first ten games (Figure 3).
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From the results in this article, it seems as if players not only improve,
but also learn to play in a way that approaches optimality in several respects,
which we list here. Rates of winning come within about five percentage
points of the maximum win rates possible, and this average is taken without
cleaning the data of players who were obviously not trying. In looking
at box-by-box decision making, player’s probabilities of stopping came to
approximate an optimal step function after a handful of games (Figure 6).
And similar deviations from the optimal pattern were also observed in a very
idealized agent that learns from data, suggesting that some initial deviation
from optimality is inevitable. Perhaps even more remarkably, they were able
to do this with no prior knowledge of the distribution and, consequentially,
sometimes unhelpful feedback (Figure 7).
In the first game, player behavior was relatively well fit by the Value
Oblivious model which had a fixed probability of stopping at each box,
independent of the values of the boxes. In later plays, threshold-based de-
cision making—the optimal strategy for known distributions—fit the data
best (Figure 8). Further analyses uncovered that players’ implicit thresholds
were close to the optimal critical values (Figure 9), which is surprising given
the small likelihood that players actually would, or could, solve for these
values.
A few points of difference could explain the apparent departure from
prior empirical results. First, to our knowledge, ours is the first study to
begin with an unknown distribution that players can learn over time. Seem-
ingly small differences in instructions to participants could have a large
effect. As mentioned, other studies have informed participants about the
distribution, for example its minimum, maximum, and shape. Second, some
prior experimental designs have presented ranks or manipulated values that
made it difficult to impossible for participants to learn the distributions.
Third, past studies have used relatively few participants, making it difficult
to detect learning effects. For example, Campbell and Lee (2006) have 12
to 14 participants per condition and assess learning by binning the first 40,
second 40, and third 40 games played. In contrast, with over 5,000 par-
ticipants, we can examine success rates at every number of games played
beneath 20 with large sample sizes. This turns out to be important for
testing learning, as most of it happens in the first 10 games. While our set-
ting is different than prior ones, the change of focus seems merited because
many real-world search problems (such as hiring employees in a city) involve
repeated searches from learnable distributions.
A promising direction for future research would be to propose and test a
unified model of search behavior that can capture several properties observed
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here such as: the effects on unhelpful feedback (Figure 7), the transition
from value-oblivious to threshold-based decision making (Figure 8), and
the learning of near-optimal thresholds (Figure 9). Having established that
people learn to approximate optimal stopping in repeated searches through
distributions of candidates, the next challenge is to model how individual
strategies evolve with experience.
A Computation of critical values and probability
of winning in known distribution case
Note that
p1(h) = 1− F (h). (6)
This is the probability of observing something on the last round that exceeds
the best observation. Generally
pt(h) =
{ ∫∞
h F (x)
t−1f(x)dx+ F (h)pt−1(h) ct ≤ h∫∞
ct
F (x)t−1f(x)dx+
∫ ct
h pt−1(x)f(x)dx+ F (h)pt−1(h) ct > h
=
{
1−F (h)t
t + F (h)pt−1(h) ct ≤ h
1−F (ct)t
t +
∫ ct
h pt−1(x)f(x)dx+ F (h)pt−1(h) ct > h
(7)
To understand (7), first note that if the critical value is less than the
historically best observation, anything exceeding the historically best ob-
servation h is acceptable. Thus, if something better, x, is observed, it is
accepted, in which case the player wins if all the subsequent observations
are worse, with probability F (x)t−1. Otherwise, we inherit h and have a
probability of winning pt−1(h) in the next period.
If ct > h, then an acceptance occurs only if the realization x exceeds
ct, in which case the probability of winning remains F (x)
t−1. If the player
experiences a value between h and ct, the historical maximum rises but is
not accepted. Finally, if the observation is less than h, the historically best
observation is not incremented and the player moves to period t− 1.
Let p¯t be the value of pt arising when ct = ht. Then
Lemma 1. p¯t(h) =
∑t
j=1
F (h)j−1−F (h)t
t+1−j
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. The lemma is trivially satisfied at
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t = 1. Suppose it is satisfied at t− 1. Then, from (7),
p¯t(h) =
1− F (h)t
t
+ F (h)pt−1(h) =
1− F (h)t
t
+ F (h)
t−1∑
j=1
F (h)j−1 − F (h)t−1
t− j
=
1− F (h)t
t
+
t−1∑
j=1
F (h)j − F (h)t
t− j
=
1− F (h)t
t
+
t∑
j=2
F (h)j−1 − F (h)t
t+ 1− j =
t∑
j=1
F (h)j−1 − F (h)t
t+ 1− j
Note that, at the value xt = ct, the searcher must be indifferent between
accepting xt and rejecting, in which case the history becomes ct. Therefore,
∂pt
∂ct
∣∣∣∣
ht=ct
= 0.
This gives
0 = −f(ct)F (ct)t−1 + f(ct)p¯t−1(ct),
or,
F (ct)
t−1 =
t−1∑
j=1
F (ct)
j−1 − F (ct)t−1
t− j . (8)
Equation 8 is intuitive, in that it says F (ct)
t−1 = p¯t−1(ct), that is, the
probability of winning given an acceptance of ct, which is F (ct)
t−1, equals
the probability of winning given that ct is rejected and becomes the going-
forward history, which would give a probability of winning of p¯t−1(ct). Thus,
pt(h) =
{ ∑t
j=1
F (h)j−1−F (h)t
t+1−j ct ≤ h
1−F (ct)t
t +
∫ ct
h pt−1(x)f(x)dx+ F (h)pt−1(h) ct > h
Letting i = T − t, and zi = F (ct) we can rewrite (8) to give
zt−1t =
t−1∑
j=1
zj−1t − zt−1t
t− j , or z
t
t =
t−1∑
j=1
zjt − ztt
t− j (9)
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B Computation of probability of winning in un-
known distribution case
The probability of winning for a fixed value of k and T periods is
Thus,
1 =
t−1∑
j=1
zj−tt − 1
t− j =
t−1∑
i=1
z−it − 1
i
(10)
pt(h) =
{ ∑t
j=1
hj−1−ht
t+1−j zt ≤ h
1−ztt
t +
∫ zt
h pt−1(x)dx+ hpt−1(h) zt > h
(11)
∫ ∞
0
kF (x)k−1f(x)
T∑
m=k+1
F (x)m−k−1
∫ ∞
x
f(y)F (y)T−mdydx
=
T∑
m=k+1
∫ 1
0
kxm−2
∫ 1
x
yT−mdydx =
T∑
m=k+1
∫ 1
0
kxm−2
1− xT−m+1
T −m+ 1 dx
=
T∑
m=k+1
k
T−m+1
∫ 1
0
xm−2−xT−1dx =
T∑
m=k+1
k
T−m+1
(
1
m−1 − 1T
)
= kT
T∑
m=k+1
1
m−1
C Appendix Figures
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Figure 10: Screenshot of the a 15 box treatment with 3 boxes opened.
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Figure 11: Rates of winning the game for human players where each player
played at least 7 games. Error bars indicated ±1 standard error, when they
are not visible they are smaller than the points. The area of each point is
proportional to the number of players in the average.
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Figure 12: In Figure 6(a) different players contribute to different curves.
For example, a player who only played one time would only contribute to
the red curve, while someone who played 10 times would contribute to all
three curves. To address these selection effects, in this plot, we restrict to
the first 7 games of those who played at least 7 games.
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